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ABSTRACT 
Rosanne M. Horswill: Swayed by Headlines or Hardened by Experience? The Influence of 
American Discourse on the Mission to Armenia 
(Under the direction of Professor Sarah Shields) 
In August 1919, President Wilson commissioned the American Military Mission to 
Armenia to investigate the post-World War I situation in Anatolia and report recommendations 
to Congress on potential American responsibilities in the region.  The President expected the 
final report, composed by Major General James Harbord, to present impartial observations 
consistent with the dispassionate language characteristic of military prose.  This would have 
allowed Congress to base its decisions on military judgements rather than on existing partisan 
reports which favored diplomatic or humanitarian agendas.  Though Harbord’s report 
predominately exhibited the institutional style he adopted as an officer and reflected a hardened 
worldview shaped over his thirty-year career, his lifetime exposure to American media narratives 
on Armenians was indelibly present as well. 
Examining Harbord’s sources reveals that he had absorbed competing public and military 
narratives that needed reconciliation in his report.  I analyzed 23,399 articles from American 
newspapers, alongside pamphlets published by the American Board of Commissioners for 
Foreign Missions and diplomatic reports produced by the Inquiry, to trace discursive trends on 
Armenians as they evolved in the United States.  Additionally, I used the personal papers of 
Harbord and other mission members, as well as archival documents on the American Military 
Mission to Armenia for evidence of Harbord’s own military experiences with hardship, his 
adoption of institutional language, and candid observations from the mission itself.  Thus, by 
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examining the language choices in the final report, drawing attention to the recurring institutional 
style and highlighting peculiar points where exceptional descriptions appeared, I found that 
Harbord was unable to maintain the dispassionate, impartial style that was expected without 
occasionally drawing on the popular tropes that dominated American headlines throughout his 
adult life.  My findings emphasize how public reports often challenge officers to satisfy fraught, 







































TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………1 
SECTION I: THE EFFECTS OF NEWS MEDIA ON AMERICAN DISCOURSE….….……15 
SECTION II: A WORLDVIEW SHAPED BY MILITARY EXPERIENCE…….……...…….28 
SECTION III: THE HARBORD REPORT………………………………………….………....42 









The message arrived on 25 June 1919, as Major General James Guthrie Harbord was 
preparing his daily agenda in Chaumont, France, a small town on the Marne nearly 170 miles by 
rail from Paris.1  As Chief of Staff for the American Expeditionary Forces, Harbord was 
accustomed to receiving varied correspondence ranging from military matters to diplomacy, but 
this particular message broached a topic he had not yet confronted in an official capacity.  Henry 
Morgenthau, the former United States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, was writing from the 
Hotel Ritz in Paris to describe a “very serious problem in the Trans-Caucasus.”  The letter urged 
Harbord to accept responsibilities as an “Allied Resident” in Armenia to manage humanitarian 
tasks, accommodate Armenian repatriation in Eastern Anatolia, and serve as the unofficial 
governor-general until America decided whether to undertake a mandate in the region.2   
With the Paris Peace Conference nearing an arrangement with Germany, the agenda was 
rapidly shifting to territorial and governance decisions concerning the defeated Ottoman Empire.  
Morgenthau, along with Herbert Hoover – then Chairman of the American Committee for Relief 
in the Near East – were two American bureaucrats working among an array of international 
plenipotentiaries to resolve what had become known as the Eastern Question.  Long before 
World War I, Europeans were concerned with the eventual cessation of Ottoman power and the 
 
1 Letter from Henry Morgenthau to James Harbord, 25 June 1919, Page 56 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, 
Box 8, Blue Bound Book Titled: "World War Military Activity, General James G. Harbord, 1917-1923." Library of 
Congress Sticker:0 012 042 108 6, Manuscripts Division Reading Room, Madison Building.  All references to the 
James G. Harbord Papers are from the Manuscripts Division Reading Room, Library of Congress Madison Building. 
2 Morgenthau to Harbord, 25 June 1919, Pages 56-58 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 8. 
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fate of the smaller states in the Balkans, the Adriatic seaports, and the territory spanning from 
Anatolia throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.3  For Americans, the compelling component of 
the Eastern Question was the aptly titled Armenian Question, dealing specifically with Ottoman 
territories in Eastern Anatolia which were historically inhabited by Christian Armenians who 
were subject to Muslim governance.  Despite the 1878 Treaty of Berlin, which obligated the 
Ottoman state to provide just treatment for Armenians following the Russo-Ottoman War of the 
preceding year, the international community learned of a series of massacres condoned by the 
state against Armenians in 1894.  By Thanksgiving Day that year, American newspapers in every 
major city had published articles on the human tragedy unfolding in the Ottoman Empire.  As a 
result, American positions on the Armenian Question evolved in the shadow of newspaper 
headlines describing Armenians suffering because “they actually stood up for their rights under 
the law, just as an American would, a thing no Turk could endure from a Christian.”4   
As public, humanitarian, and diplomatic interest in Armenians evolved over the 
subsequent decades, pressure to increase American involvement compelled the United States to 
commission the American Military Mission to Armenia to investigate the post-World War I 
situation in Anatolia and report recommendations to Congress on potential responsibilities in the 
region.  The President and his advisors expected the final report, composed by Harbord, to 
present impartial observations consistent with the dispassionate language characteristic of 
 
3 Arthur R. Gray, “The Eastern Question, Old and New,” The Sewanee Review, Vol. 12, No. 1 (January 1904): 92-
113, 112.  
4 Edward C. Little, in a speech titled “The Armenian Question: In the American House of Representatives,” 
delivered on Thursday, 7 February 1918 and reprinted from the “Congressional Review” of 4 March 1918, by The 
Frederick Printing Company, Ltd., London, 10, from Oxford, Bodlean Library, Weston Library Special Collections, 
Papers of A. Toynbee, Box 44/1, MS.13967. 
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military prose.  This would have allowed Congress to base its decisions on military judgements 
rather than on existing partisan reports which favored diplomatic or humanitarian agendas.5   
Though Harbord’s report predominately exhibited the institutional style he adopted as an 
officer and reflected a hardened worldview shaped over his thirty-year career, his lifetime 
exposure to American media narratives on Armenians was indelibly present as well.  By 
examining the language choices in the final report, drawing attention to the recurring institutional 
style, and highlighting peculiar points where exceptional descriptions appeared, it becomes clear 
that Harbord was unable to maintain the dispassionate, impartial style that was expected without 
occasionally using popular tropes that dominated American headlines throughout his adult life.  
Additionally, Harbord’s experience in 1919 reveals how public-facing reports have long 
challenged officers to satisfy idealistic expectations civilian decision-makers associated with 
military institutions. 
Beginning with a synopsis of the events between Morgenthau’s letter in June 1919 and 
President Woodrow Wilson’s commissioning Harbord to lead the American Military Mission to 
Armenia in August, I will briefly evaluate of the historiographical use of the Harbord Report and 
review the theories historians have used to describe discursive trends.  Two analysis sections 
follow, to explain and present evidence first on how newspapers exposed Harbord to the 
American public discourse on Armenia, and second, how his prior military experience influenced 
his perceptions in Anatolia.  I conclude with a discussion of the Harbord Report, interpreting the 
 
5 Congress and the State Department believed that American responsibility in Armenia hinged on the feasibility of 
military support, which would have allowed relief organizations freedom of movement throughout the region and 
protected transportation and communications networks to support repatriation of Armenian refugees.  The 
Subcommittee on Senate Joint Resolution 106, “A Joint Resolution for the Maintenance of Peace in Armenia,” 
reported that impartial military recommendations were “absolutely essential” prior to a Congressional decision to 
commit federal resources to aiding Armenians; Warren G. Harding (OH), “Statement of Hon. William Phillips, 
Assistant Secretary of State,” Congressional Record 66-1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919), 35.  
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ways it exhibited trends consistent with the language and impartial tone used by period writers, 
and exposing peculiarities in Harbord’s discursive choices influenced by the American public 
narrative.  My findings ultimately revealed that the pretense of an impartial report was fraught 
from the beginning and that by including popular tropes, Harbord exemplified how military 
advisors might better inform civilian decision-makers without taking neutrality to the extreme.   
Prior to August 1919, American representatives constantly debated the advantages of 
increasing an official presence overseas, and Harbord was initially unconvinced by 
Morgenthau’s proposal to appoint an Allied Resident in Armenia.  Having served with General 
John Pershing since the American Expeditionary Forces first entered World War I, Harbord was 
privy to Allied concerns regarding Ottoman territory and American interest in the Armenians; 
but his focus in late June was on managing operations to return American troops home and on 
anticipating the immediate military effects of the Treaty of Versailles.  Harbord replied to 
Morgenthau’s initial letter on the morning of 28 June 1919, before witnessing the signing of the 
Peace Treaty at the Palace of Versailles that afternoon.6  He refused Morgenthau’s proposal, 
writing that “I should be proud to undertake such a duty as this under our own country alone, but 
under the conditions as I understand your letter to state them, I think success impossible.”7  It 
would be another six weeks until Allied representatives in Paris composed a comprehensive plan 
 
6 Letter from Secretary General of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to James Harbord, 27 June 1919, 
ticket to the Salles des Glaces in the Palace of Versailles to witness the Peace Treaty being signed with Germany at 
3pm on 28 June 1919, from James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 9, Blue Bound Book Titled “Personal 
Miscellany, 1917-1919, J.G. Harbord,” Library of Congress sticker: 0 012 042 112 8. 
7 Letter from James Harbord to Henry Morgenthau, 28 June 1919, Pages 59-60 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-
1938, Box 8. 
5 
 
for the Armenian Question and officially appointed Harbord as the Chief of the American 
Military Mission to Armenia.8  
Throughout the summer, Morgenthau and Hoover remained the primary proponents of 
American action in Armenia and continually lobbied for President Wilson’s support alongside 
other bureaucrats, politicians, and members of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace.  
The day after the Peace Treaty was signed, the President received a letter signed by Charles 
Evens Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sharp Williams, Alfred E. Smith, James 
W. Gerard, Frederic Courtland Penfield, and Charles W. Eliot that urged American intervention 
in Eastern Anatolia and showed bipartisan agreement that America must send aid, “enable the 
Armenians to occupy the non-occupied parts of Armenia,” and “secure prompt and full justice 
for Armenia.”9  Less than a week later, on 5 July 1919, the American Commission to Negotiate 
Peace wrote to Secretary of State Robert Lansing “that a Mission should immediately be sent to 
Armenia” to investigate a potential American mandate and “the general political and economic 
problems involved in setting up the new State of Armenia.”10   
Though discussion of an official American presence in Eastern Anatolia to physically 
manage Armenian affairs was a new priority among Americans, the Allied governments had 
advocated a formal administrative arrangement since January 1919.  After World War I, the 
 
8 “General Orders No. 87” from the General Headquarters, American Expeditionary Forces, France, 11 August 
1919, page 63 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 8. 
9 Letter from Charles Evens Hughes, Elihu Root, Henry Cabot Lodge, John Sharp Williams, Alfred E. Smith, James 
W. Gerard, Frederic Courtland Penfield, Charles W. Eliot to President Wilson, 28 June 1919, from George Van 
Horn Moseley Papers, 1855-1960, Box 5, Folder 5 “Military Papers,” Red Bound Book Titled “Military Mission to 
Armenia,” Manuscripts Division Reading Room, Madison Building.  All references to the George Van Horn 
Moseley Papers are from the Manuscripts Division Reading Room, Library of Congress Madison Building. 
10 Letter from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State, 5 July 1919, from George Van 




League of Nations commissioned member states to administer territories through ‘mandatory’ 
relationships.  British Prime Minister David Lloyd George often pressed for American 
interference in Ottoman territory but continually found President Wilson “much opposed to any 
intervention on the part of the United States.” 11  President Wilson recognized that a potential 
mandate in Armenia would need Congressional approval and would exceed existing bipartisan 
support for relief work.  Congress needed to be convinced that a mandate was feasible and in line 
with public appeals to provide justice for suffering Armenians.   
At the time, specialist missions were an established means of gathering information for 
American diplomatic decisions and several had already yielded reports on Germany, Poland, and 
Russia.12  However, prior fact-finding missions in Ottoman territory produced reports 
reminiscent of the sensational headlines that had filled American newsstands since the 
Armenians became international news in the 1890s.  Throughout July 1919, advocates for 
intervention determined that a military mission was the only way to compile impartial 
information, estimate the cost of American intervention, and achieve a dispassionate report on 
conditions in Eastern Anatolia.  Morgenthau and Hoover explicitly urged that “exhaustive 
investigation should be undertaken by impartial experts on the ground as to the problems 
involved and measures to be taken before more than support to refugees is undertaken.”13   
 
11 David Lloyd George, Memoirs of the Peace Conference, Volume 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1939), 
117. 
12 Mesut Uyar, “An American Military Observer of Turkish Independence War: Charles Wellington Furlong,” in A 
Bridge Between Cultures: Studies on Ottoman and Republican Turkey in Memory of Ali İhsan Bağış, ed. Sinan 
Kuneralp (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006), 181. 
13 Letter from the American Commission to Negotiate Peace to the Secretary of State, 3 July 1919, from George Van 




Harbord represented the quintessential, war-hardened professional capable of leading a 
mission to Armenia based on his exemplary military record, endorsement from Secretary of War 
Newton Baker, and consistent recommendation by members of the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace.  The media echoed these sentiments based on Harbord’s reputation as Chief of 
Staff, describing how his “approachability, coupled with his intuitive directness and ability to 
listen, has made him in the opinion of the Americans who have had and are having daily 
experience with European imbroglios, the ideal selection for this most important of our 
somewhat numerous missions.”14  On 1 August 1919, via a personal telegram, Secretary Lansing 
officially notified Harbord that the “President approved of Hoover Morgenthau recommendation 
that a Mission of Investigation headed by General Harbord be sent to Armenia [sic].”15  Now, 
with clear direction, assurance of appropriate funds, his choice of military officers to accompany 
him on the mission, and “certainty as to his authority” as Chief of Mission, Harbord was honored 
to lead the American Military Mission to Armenia.16  Once Allied leaders and the United States 
Congress learned of Harbord’s appointment to the official mission, they eagerly awaited the final 
report.  Hulusi Akar is one of the few scholars who has recognized the potential of the Harbord 
Report and his 2005 dissertation does an admirable job describing Harbord’s impact from a 
diplomatic perspective.17 
 
14 Lucian Swift Kirtland, “Does It Mean the Mandate?” Leslie’s Weekly (27 September 1919), from James G. 
Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 36, Green Bound Book Titled “Gen. James G. Harbord, Clippings, 1917-1919,” 
Library of Congress sticker: 0 012 042 103 7. 
15 Telegram from Lansing to Harbord, 1 August 1919, from George Van Horn Moseley Papers, 1855-1960, Box 5, 
Folder 5 “Military Papers,” Red Bound Book Titled “Military Mission to Armenia.” 
16 Letter from James Harbord to Henry Morgenthau, 28 June 1919, Pages 59-60 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-
1938, Box 8. 
17 Hulusi Akar, “Harbord Military Mission to Armenia: The Story of an American Fact Finding Mission and Its 
Effects on Turkish-American Relations,” unpublished dissertation, submitted to the Atatürk Institute for Modern 
Turkish History, Boğaziçi University, 2005. 
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Harbord completed the Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia on 16 
October 1919, after a month-long journey from Constantinople to Tiflis during which he and his 
mission observed conditions in Anatolia and the Caucasus.18  The Harbord Report, as it was 
popularly known, circulated among American politicians, international diplomats, and the press 
– reaching a variety of humanitarian relief and missionary groups, as well as the American 
public.  Most notably, during the 66th United States Congress, Senate Majority Leader Henry 
Cabot Lodge ordered the Harbord Report published under the title “Conditions in the Near East” 
on 13 April 1920, to ensure that all representatives were aware of Harbord’s recommendations 
before the Senate vote on an American mandate for Armenia.19 
Despite its far-reaching influence on discussions concerning Armenians and the 
governance of Anatolia after World War I, few historians have used the Harbord Report in their 
research.  The American Military Mission to Armenia tends to appear alongside other interwar 
fact-finding missions, mentioned superficially as an example of American military involvement 
in international diplomacy.20  James B. Gidney dedicated an entire chapter to the Harbord 
Mission in A Mandate for Armenia, following a chapter on the King-Crane Commission, which 
 
18 James G. Harbord, “Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia,” Stamped: Paris Peace Conference, 
184.02102/5, Microfilm 820, Roll 234, 33. 
19 James G. Harbord, Conditions in the Near East: Report of the American Military Mission to Armenia, presented 
by Mr. Lodge (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920). 
20 Other references to American fact-finding missions occur briefly in Stanley E. Kerr’s The Lions of Marash: 
Personal Experiences with American Near East Relief, 1919-1922 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1973); Peter Balakian’s The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2003); and Mesut Uyar’s “An American Military Observer of Turkish Independence War: 
Charles Wellington Furlong,” in A Bridge Between Cultures: Studies on Ottoman and Republican Turkey in Memory 
of Ali İhsan Bağış, ed. Sinan Kuneralp (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2006) pages 179-191.  Andrew J. Bacevich’s A 
Diplomat in Khaki: Major General Frank Ross McCoy and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1949 (Kansas: 
University Press of Kansas, 1989) incorporates participation on the Harbord Mission as one of many diplomatic 
roles played by the book’s subject, Frank McCoy, who was Harbord’s Chief of Staff at the time; and Jamil Hasanli 
mentions Harbord briefly alongside Allied military and economic concerns in the Caucasus in Foreign Policy of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan: The Difficult Road to Western Integration, 1918-1920 (London: Routledge, 2016).  
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completed its findings on potential mandates in former Ottoman territories in August 1919, just 
prior to Harbord’s arrival in Constantinople.21  The King-Crane Commission has received more 
attention than the Harbord Mission, likely because its members reported observations on Syria 
and Palestine, which have been of interest to scholars engaging with Arab nationalism and 
Zionism.22   
Apart from military and diplomatic implications, other historians who have mentioned 
the Harbord Report have done so in broader discussions on the aftermath of the Armenian 
Genocide and the international response.  A narrative sympathetic towards Armenians had 
already evolved in American newspapers and findings from the American Military Mission 
reflected the media’s pre-genocide language – decades before Raphael Lemkin conceived the 
contemporary meaning of genocide in 1944.23  Harbord wrote how the Armenians were victims 
of a “wholesale attempt on the race,” while articles from the New York Times described Ottoman 
actions as “systematic race extermination.”24  These instances where popular terminology and 
descriptions from newspaper headlines reappear in the Harbord Report may expose the degree to 
which an officer participating in international diplomacy was also a product of American public 
discourse.  Though some works allude to potential cultural influences on the Harbord Report, 
none have wholly examined how the American national discourse on Armenians since the 1890s 
 
21 James B. Gidney, A Mandate for Armenia. (Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1967), 162-163.  Chapter eight 
of A Mandate for Armenia contains information on the Harbord Mission and chapter seven covers the King-Crane 
Commission.   
22 Michael Reimer, “The King–Crane Commission at the Juncture of Politics and Historiography,” Critique: Critical 
Middle Eastern Studies, 15:2, 129-150. 
23 Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
1944), 79. 
24 Peter Balakian, The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2003), 103, 113. 
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impacted the mission and appeared in the final report.  Not only were multiple popular tropes 
present in Harbord’s writing, but the 1919 Harbord Report reflected broader American military 
and civilian attitudes about global diplomatic and humanitarian obligations.   
The Eastern and Armenian questions, as well as the Armenian genocide, dominate most 
historical work on Armenia after World War I, but not all scholars have taken a firm position in 
favor of Armenians as the sole victims.  Moderate narratives insist that scholars cease labeling 
human tragedy as sectarian suffering because the entire populace was involved in international 
war, intercommunal violence, disease, starvation, and forced migration for Armenians and 
Muslims alike.25  This has prompted new works that emphasized Eastern Anatolia as an intense 
environment of resistance, oppression, and competition between Armenians, Turks, and Kurds, 
where the state did not enforce the rule of law nor control foreign intervention.26   
Some scholars contend that the massacres in the 1890s and the state deportations in 1915 
resulted from a series of preceding events, rather than purely Ottoman racism and aggression 
targeted against Armenian subjects.  Particularly regarding the 1915 deportations, historians have 
argued that Ottoman military defeats by Russia in early 1915 instigated the state response against 
Armenians.  The Ottomans knew that Armenian volunteers had aided Russian forces in the 
Caucasus and that Armenian revolutionaries remained positioned throughout Eastern Anatolia.27  
Thus, Russian advances paired with the Allied attack on Gallipoli to strain the Ottoman defense 
 
25 Justin McCarthy, “The Anatolian Armenians, 1912-1922,” pages 17-25 in Armenians in the Ottoman Empire and 
Modern Turkey (1912-1926), compiled by the Boğaziçi University Institute for Atatürk’s Principles and the History 
of Turkish Renovation (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1984), 25. 
26 Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1993), 28.  
27 Feroz Ahmad, “Young Turk Relations with the United States, 1908-1918,” pages 83-99 in American Turkish 
Encounters: Politics and Culture, 1830-1989, Criss, Nur Bilge, Selçuk Esenbel, Tony Greenwood, and Louis 
Mazzari, eds. (United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011), 87.  
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beyond its capabilities.  According to these historians, challenges from World War I prompted 
the state “to remove the insurgent Armenian minority from the war zone,” beginning the 
deportation process that would lead to massacres on a massive scale.28  Still other scholars have 
suggested that American media reports were rumors that overstated the severity of the 
deportations and did not take into account local complexities in the region.29   
Ever since the events of 1915 played out on the international stage, the discourse 
surrounding Armenians has remained divided, permeating diplomatic, political, humanitarian, 
and public narratives throughout the past century.  Current literature continues to discuss the 
effects of Ottoman violence against Armenians during the decades preceding the establishment 
of the Republic of Turkey in October 1923; but few studies have examined the international 
response to such tragedy as it played out in the public eye.  When the American media first 
reported the 1894 massacres, Harbord and the other members of the American Military Mission 
to Armenia witnessed the torrent of headlines alongside the general public.  Newspapers across 
the country reproduced articles, continuously exposing the mission members to the American 
public discourse on Armenians as it evolved.  
The news sources reveal that Harbord absorbed competing public and military narratives 
that he attempted to reconcile in the final report.  I analyzed 23,399 articles from historical 
American newspapers, alongside pamphlets published by the American Board of Commissioners 
for Foreign Missions and diplomatic reports produced by the Inquiry, to trace discursive trends 
on Armenians as they evolved in the United States.  Comparatively, I used the personal papers of 
 
28 Bilal N. Şimşir, “The Deportees of Malta and the Armenian Question,” pages 26-41 in Armenians in the Ottoman 
Empire and Modern Turkey (1912-1926), compiled by the Boğaziçi University Institute for Atatürk’s Principles and 
the History of Turkish Renovation (Istanbul: Boğaziçi University Publications, 1984), 40. 




Harbord and other mission members, as well as archival documents on the American Military 
Mission to Armenia for evidence of Harbord’s own military experiences with hardship, his 
adoption of institutional language, and candid observations from the mission itself.  The final 
report reflected the lasting impact popular media narratives had on Harbord’s perceptions, 
despite his attempt to maintain an impartial tone for the entire report.   
Existing historiography has emphasized the broad diplomatic, military, humanitarian, and 
regional significance of the American Military Mission to Armenia, but historians have not 
sufficiently explored America’s public response to Armenian suffering and the cultural 
implications of the evolving discourse.  Scholarship on the immersive qualities of discourse, the 
professionalization of the American military post-1900, and the notion of paternalism were 
especially valuable for explaining the effects of a dominant narrative on individual Americans.     
The cultural turn in the social sciences has led historians to incorporate self-reflexivity 
and increased discussions of agency into their narratives.30  It fixes politics into everyday life, 
constructing meaning to empower and constrain actors.31  In this instance, to understand the 
media’s impact on Harbord, it is important to consider how military officers and the general 
public alike were influenced by dominant language and narratives driven by American 
newspapers.  Professional military experiences and American cultural narratives impacted 
Harbord throughout his adulthood.  All historical actors experience the immersive qualities of 
discourse and are thus able to use preexisting tropes from influential sources in their own 
writing.  The final report showed the extent to which Harbord adopted the dominant American 
 
30 Ronald Grigor Suny, Red Flag Unfurled: History, Historians, and the Russian Revolution (London: Verso, 2017), 
18.  Suny further discusses the contributions of Clifford Geertz (The Interpretation of Cultures), Michel Foucault 
(Discipline and Punish), E.P. Thompson (The Making of the English Working Class), and Hayden White 
(Metahistory); all of which are significant texts for understanding contemporary thought on the cultural turn.   
31 Suny, Red Flag Unfurled, 32-33.    
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narrative before the mission to Armenia, while evidence from his personal papers suggested 
other motivations that might have driven Harbord’s final recommendations.    
Prior to the 1919 American Military Mission to Armenia, Harbord had accumulated more 
than thirty years of military service since his enlistment on 24 January 1889.32  After graduating 
from Kansas State Agricultural College in 1886, Harbord had sought a military career and earned 
an officer’s commission after serving two and a half years in the enlisted ranks.33  Harbord 
experienced a range of assignments in the United States, then worked in an aide-de-camp 
position with the Department Commander in Cuba during the Spanish-American War, and later 
spent nearly twelve years as a Captain and Brevet Colonel in the insular government of the 
Philippines.34   
Exploring the professionalization of the American military as it evolved during Harbord’s 
career provides valuable insight to how he became inculcated with an institutional ethic that 
valued impartiality and neutral judgement.  The creation of the Army General Staff, as part of 
Secretary of War Elihu Root’s reforms in 1903, was a formative step in the military’s evolution 
towards a professional force capable of strategic planning, global contingency plans, and 
interservice communication.35  Though institutional changes prompted by the Root Reforms 
 
32 “Order No. 17” from Post of Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 24 January 1889, Item 3 of James G. Harbord Papers, 
1886-1938, Box 6, Blue Bound Book Titled: "Military Record J. G. Harbord, U.S. Army, 1889-1916." Library of 
Congress Sticker: 0 012 042 100 1. 
33 Merrill L. Bartlett, James Guthrie Harbord:1866-1947, Register of His Personal Papers (Washington D.C.: 
History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1995), viii-ix. 
34 “General Order No. 5” from Headquarters Department of Santiago and Puerto Principe in Santiago, Cuba, 23 
January 1900, Item 18 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 6; and “Memorandum, 17 August 1903” from 
Washington, D.C. to Manila, Item 51 of James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 1, Blue Bound Book Titled: 
“Private Letters of J.G. Harbord, Maj. Gen., U.S. Army, Vol. 1, 1886-1906.” Library of Congress Sticker: 0 012 042 
080 A. 
35 Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy (New 
York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), 200. 
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were initially slow to take hold, the United States’ experience in World War I solidified a 
cultural shift as the military embraced professionalization via “a rigorous military education 
system and an active General Staff.”36  Not only did the military institution now prioritize 
intellectual rigor as part of professional education, but Congress was kept abreast of these 
changes through annual reports.37  Within this construct, civilian decision-makers came to expect 
impartial judgements from officers and this new, institutional style of communication became a 
recognizable characteristic in military reports, correspondence, and professional journals.   
In August 1903, Harbord witnessed the initial impacts of the Army’s institutional 
changes to the General Staff when he joined the Philippine Constabulary.38  This phase in his 
career also exposed Harbord to notions of paternalism and cultural processes that competed with 
popular political narratives propagated by the American news media.  At its core, paternalism 
was represented by America’s military and administrative interference in Philippine affairs based 
on a perceived obligation to affect the welfare, needs, and interests of the Filipino population.39  
Within paternalist discourse, a range of complex responses to imperialism emerged during 
Harbord’s years serving in the Philippines.  Thus, Harbord’s personal letters, travel writing, and 
official correspondence are valuable sources for determining his views on American 
 
36 Rory M. McGovern, “George W. Goethals: Life and Reform in the U.S. Army, 1876-1919” (Ph.D. Dissertation, 
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38 Memorandum from Washington D.C. to Manila, 17 August 1903, from James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, 
Box 1. 
39 Gerald Dworkin, “Paternalism,” The Monist 56, no. 1 (1972): 65.  
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international relations.40  The perceptions Harbord garnered in the Philippines and throughout his 
military career can then be applied to the mission to Armenia – during which Harbord was 
ordered to investigate a potential mandatory relationship that could invoke paternalistic themes 
and authorize the United States administrative responsibility in Eastern Anatolia.   
 
Section I: The Effects of News Media on American Discourse 
Throughout Harbord’s career, newspapers drove information dissemination in the United 
States, servicing all major urban areas and many local communities.  To determine which 
publication trends and dominant narratives Harbord observed, this section traces Harbord’s 
career movements following his college graduation in 1886 through 1917 and describes how the 
public narrative on Armenians simultaneously evolved in America.   
At the turn of the twentieth century, news media were designed to accommodate diverse 
audiences including businesses, middle-class readers, confessional organizations, and mass 
political parties.41  Recent studies using labor statistics on discretionary spending have shown 
that reading was widespread among working-class families as well, expanding the reach of 
media outlets to all classes of American society.42  The narratives that newspapers propagated 
often determined national priorities, especially for international issues.  Some journalism 
 
40 Mary A. Renda, Taking Haiti: Military Occupation and the Culture of U.S. Imperialism, 1915-1940 (Chapel Hill, 
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42 David Paul Nord, Communities of Journalism: A History of American Newspapers and Their Readers (Urbana 
and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), 229. 
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scholars contend “that newspapers tell people not what to think but what to think about,” and this 
notion legitimately described the evolving national opinion on Armenians as well.43     
The early narrative inserted Armenians into elements of Russo-Ottoman relations and 
focused on human interest stories sourced from American missionaries and Christian 
humanitarian groups that had worked with Armenians since the mid-1800s.  An article published 
by the St. Louis Post on 29 January 1888 typified this peripheral status for Armenia by including 
it only to report Russian strategic gains against the Ottomans “thanks to the annexation of Kars 
and Batoun, after the war of 1877-78.”44  Meanwhile, other newspapers broadcast stories about 
proselytized Armenians in Anatolia and the conservative homelife of Armenian women.45  
For decades, missionaries informed American public opinion concerning the Ottoman 
Empire and its various subject groups using narratives tailored to promote Christianity.46  Isaac 
Bird and William Goodell, accompanied by their wives Abagail and Ann, were among the first 
individuals from the distinguished American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions 
(ABCFM) to establish an American missionary presence in Anatolia.47  Many other men and 
women followed, and it was from their letters and journals that a language of static religious 
identity and social discrimination began permeating American news media.  Derived from 
 
43 Nord, Communities of Journalism, 280. 
44 St. Louis Post - Dispatch (1879-1922), Special Cablegram to, the Post, "Russia’s Purpose," Jan. 29, 1888. 
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missionary language, religious and ethnic designators including “Turk,” “Kurd,” and 
“Armenian” became standard in public conversation.48  
Foreign missions offered American churches the opportunity to gain legitimacy on a 
global scale and the Andover Theological Seminary in Boston, Massachusetts was the epicenter 
for recruiting and educating missionaries.49  In 1889, the American Board published a historical 
sketch of their missions in the Ottoman Empire to date, emphasizing the dramatic expansion of 
missions to Armenia after 1871 and stating that “the story of missionary operation since that 
date, if given in detail, would require a volume.”50  The increased number of missionaries 
working in Ottoman territory enabled the ABCFM to regularly publish pamphlets that advertised 
foreign missions, solicited donations, and gave newspaper editors a constant supply of 
evangelical language to incorporate into articles.  “The Gospel in the Mountains of Turkey,” 
“Heathen Claims and Christian Duty,” “The World Crisis and Missionary Work,” and “A Cry to 
Heaven from a Housetop” were among the popular titles that news media adopted to evoke 
emotion from their collective readership.51      
From 1889 through 1893, Harbord was just beginning his military career and becoming 
accustomed to the peripatetic lifestyle of an officer.  After completing his enlisted years in 
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Spokane, Washington, Harbord enjoyed assignments closer to his home-state of Kansas while 
serving in a variety of junior officer positions at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Fort Reno, 
Oklahoma; Pond Creek Station, Illinois; and Fort Brown, Texas.52  During this time, prominent 
newspapers in Chicago, St. Louis, Nashville, and Austin were available to Harbord and eighteen 
letters from peers and supervisors describing Harbord’s erudition suggested that he constantly 
remained abreast of news and public views via journals, books, and newspapers.53  
Technological advances in industry expanded the influence of American news media and 
diversified the types of individuals who interacted with journalists.  Prior to 1894, articles 
featuring Armenians appeared in newspapers at a rate of 13 to 31 articles per month and steady 
input from missionaries continued to dominate the public narrative that Harbord was exposed 
to.54  Recent technological developments including a mass-produced mechanical typewriter by 
the Remington Acme Company and telephone lines connecting major cities enabled newspapers 
to keep up with public demand for information.55  Amid increased circulation, new groups were 
now interacting with American newspapers to inform the narrative.  By 1890, Armenian 
 
52 Orders documenting Harbord’s movement during this period include: “Promotion Orders for Commission as 2nd 
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immigrants from the Ottoman Empire were arriving in the United States and establishing 
societies in New York, Boston, and other major metropoles along the Eastern seaboard.56   
The influx of Armenians introduced first-hand accounts of revolts, religious suffering, 
calls for reform, and pleas for aid into media headlines.  The New York Times was among the 
first newspapers to respond to these new sources and quickly began running headlines featuring 
“Armenians in America: An Industrious and Liberty-Loving People.”57  Nationwide, newspapers 
echoed the changing narrative and Armenians were increasingly viewed as a distinct identity 
group, rather than a product of missionary proselytization or an accessory to Russo-Ottoman 
affairs.  
The European press was another occasional source for American newspapers to glean 
reports on Armenia, reprint stories from abroad, and further construct the public narrative.  
James Bryce, who in 1881 was the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford University, “would 
be the most prominent British intellectual to write about the Armenian Question.”58  Alongside 
Bryce, former Prime Minister William Gladstone was another vigorous opponent of the Ottoman 
Empire who would influence American public opinion indirectly in the newspaper media.59  In 
the dominant British narrative, support for Armenians directly coincided with opposition to 
Ottoman sovereignty.  Similarly, French opinions focused on support for Armenians via relief 
efforts and French narratives found their ways into the American press as well.  The French had 
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a physical presence in the Southern Anatolian region of Cilicia where they would regularly 
interact with American missionary organizations and influence reports bound for the United 
States by promoting increased humanitarian responsibility in the region. 
As the American discourse gradually evolved with missionaries, Armenian immigrants, 
and the European press informing the news media, Harbord received orders to attend the United 
States Infantry and Cavalry School and begin the next phase of his military career.  On 1 
September 1893, Harbord reported to Fort Leavenworth, Kansas where he would spend the next 
two years immersed in courses on military strategy, tactics, and international law.60  Harbord and 
his fellow officers were given a hiatus from normal military responsibilities and had the 
opportunity to focus on individual development and intellectual growth, which involved staying 
informed about domestic and international events.  With Harbord coincidentally poised to 
witness a dramatic shift in the public narrative, violence spread throughout Anatolia and reports 
of massacres spurred the first major surge of American articles featuring tragedy in Armenia. 
On 26 November 1894, front-page headlines appeared on newsstands across the country 
reporting “Down-Trodden Christians of Armenia Cry for Help” and the “Butchery of the 
Armenians.”61  The ABCFM had grown politically and financially leading into the 1890s and 
their missionary presence in the Ottoman Empire positioned them to dominate the narrative 
presented to the media during the 1894 massacres.  Dominant themes appealed to Christian 
charity, which reporters further enhanced by releasing the reports on the Monday before 
Thanksgiving Day.  The American populace empathized with the Armenians more than other 
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suffering populations because they were considered “the Anglo-Saxons of the East,” they shared 
a Christian heritage, and they inhabited a region largely uninfluenced by other European 
Powers.62  Armenians represented a people in need and the news media’s emphasis on Armenian 
victimhood supported the evolving narrative that America was a legitimate source of 
international philanthropy and influence.  
Armenian immigrants continued to inform the narrative as well, and multiple national 
newspapers often reproduced their appeals.  The Los Angeles Times bolstered their own 
headlines with an added plea from Mr. Herant Mesrob Kiretchkian, the Secretary for the Phil-
Armenia Association of the Northwest.  Articles throughout America echoed Kiretchkian’s 
words urging “one American cent from every man, woman and child whose heart has ached for 
the stricken Armenian nation.”63  Genocide scholars that recognize the Armenian genocide of 
1915 as the template for many future atrocities, generally acknowledge that the American 
charitable response to the 1894 Armenian massacres “was the first international human rights 
movement in American history and helped to define the nation’s emerging global identity.64   
The stories of atrocities overwhelmingly appalled the American public, creating a firm 
narrative in favor of the Armenians.  Newspaper headlines indicated that the Armenian 
massacres overshadowed all other reports of international hardship and despite intense human 
suffering for the entire population in Eastern Anatolia, the Ottomans were viewed as the 
aggressors.65  Articles published prior to the autumn of 1894 on Armenian revolutionary 
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activities and calls for reform were silenced and replaced with graphic language of flesh-eating 
Kurds, revolting cruelties, and full-page artistic depictions of Armenians suffering in a “ravine of 
death.”66  The dominant narrative in the American media branded Turks, Kurds, Tatars, and 
other non-Christians as merciless butchers.   
While Harbord was finishing up his time at the Infantry and Cavalry School in Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, American newspapers were featuring Armenians at publication rates of 
101 articles per month, which was significantly higher than during previous years.67  During 
Harbord’s subsequent assignment at Fort Brown, Texas, newspaper trends continued to build 
steadily with numbers peaking at 7,244 articles, a rate of 213 published per month.  From local 
committee meetings to the Senate floor, the dominant Armenian victimhood narrative permeated 
American communities.  On 24 January 1896, the United States Senate agreed to a resolution 
that officially condemned the Ottomans for their atrocities and demanded “that the civilized 
governments shall, by peaceful negotiations, or, if necessary, by force of arms, prevent and 
suppress the cruelties and massacres inflicted on the Armenian subjects of Turkey.”68   
On the regional spectrum, fundraising efforts were headed by politicians, businessmen, 
and humanitarian organizations in all major cities.  Local committees formed as satellites to the 
National Armenian Relief Committee, an organization federated in 1896 with a board including 
John D. Rockefeller, Spencer Trask, Jacob Schiff and a number of other wealthy industrialists, 
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financiers, and philanthropists.69  These committees distributed educational material on Armenia, 
produced fund-raising pamphlets, and organized public speakers to further integrate Armenian 
relief into public consciousness.70    
These narrative trends emphasizing Armenian victimhood continued through July 1898, 
when Harbord left Texas for an assignment at Camp Cuba Libre in Jacksonville, Florida that 
would prepare him for duty in Cuba the following summer.71  Thereafter, however, as the 
Spanish-American War monopolized national media coverage, there was a rapid decline in 
articles that coincided with reports that the Armenian massacres had subsided.  Publication rates 
dropped to 55 articles per month and would never again approach the elevated rates of the mid-
1890s.  By January 1900, after six months immersed in regimental duties, the Departmental 
Commander in Santiago, Cuba appointed Harbord as the aide-de-camp, where new military 
responsibilities consumed his attention.72   
Over the next fifteen years, as Harbord moved for assignments at the Secretary of War 
Office in Washington, D.C., in the Philippine Islands, and with the United States Army Western 
Division in California, there were occasional resurgences of stories featuring reports of new 
atrocities against Armenians, but the public narrative remained generally unchanged.73  Relief 
organizations, Armenian Benevolent Societies, and missionaries continued to mobilize support 
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from the American public and undermine attention paid to other social and religious groups.  A 
strong relationship formed between missionaries and international relief teams under the Red 
Cross – which, under Clara Barton’s leadership, introduced a new dimension of international 
feminism.74  Women’s literary newspapers and the American Woman Suffrage Association’s 
Women’s Journal “would cover the Armenian crisis in greater depth and with a more activist 
perspective” than other national organizations, revealing how the American public narrative on 
the Armenian situation was enhanced by female activists.75  
Prominent religious groups visibly supported the pro-Armenian narrative as well.  The 
Christian Science Monitor in Boston, Massachusetts; The American Israelite in Cincinnati, Ohio; 
The Jewish Exponent in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; The Lutheran Evangelist in Dayton, Ohio; 
and the Afro-American representing the African Methodist Episcopal Church out of Baltimore, 
Maryland were among the national religious newspapers that continued publishing articles on 
Armenians throughout the early 1900s.  Secular newspapers would also feature reports on 
religious activism in favor of Armenians, with headlines like “A Scathing Sermon on the Cruel 
and Bloody Turks” regularly appearing on newsstands to invigorate public interest.76 
Prior to 1915, reporters kept the narrative alive by interviewing Armenian immigrants 
and returning mission workers to integrate their personal stories of atrocities from the previous 
decades into the existing national narrative.  Multiple newspapers published annual appeals at 
Thanksgiving for charitable donations, special features on women and orphans, and full-page 
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stories detailing Christmas in Armenia.77  Occasionally, peculiar stories would circulate in the 
American media to generate attention – one of the more interesting examples was of a modern 
Robin Hood tale set in the Caucasus.78  It is unlikely, however, that Harbord would have noticed 
these odd deviations from the dominant narrative, especially once World War I began in 1914 
and articles on Armenians were relegated to less prominent sections of national newspapers.  
A final spike in publications on Armenians appeared after the Ottoman Empire joined the 
war and the 1915 deportations began.  Initially, the media coverage strictly focused on World 
War I and the American public perceived the Ottoman Empire through the established lens of 
derogatory and religiously-charged newspaper headlines reporting: “Army of 90,000 Moslems 
Menace Russian Province,” “Ravagers of Armenia Fit Comrades of the Desolators of Flanders,” 
and “Holy War Is Declared: Decree May Loose Millions of Moslems Against Allies.”79  As soon 
as the international news outlets began receiving accounts of more Armenian atrocities in spring 
1915, American newspapers immediately responded with renewed public appeals for funds and a 
constant flow of articles graphically describing human tragedy in the Ottoman Empire.  The 
articles inundated the public with reports that “sick people are throwing themselves into graves, 
begging grave diggers to bury them; women are going mad and eating grass and carrion; parents 
are putting their children out of their misery.”80   
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At the time, Harbord was still serving the Army’s Western Division in San Francisco, 
California and was fully immersed in news media when publication rates for articles on 
Armenians inflated to 96 articles per month.  Personal correspondence provided evidence that 
even as a senior officer in his late forties, Harbord remained committed to intellectual 
development and stayed abreast of international issues.  He wrote often, including a prize essay 
on “The History of the Cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia” published by the Journal of 
the United States Cavalry Association.81  Apart from membership in professional military 
associations, Harbord also subscribed to political periodicals to expand his understanding of 
prominent issues beyond the contents of newspaper headlines.82  According to Harbord, The 
Argonaut, a political quarterly published in San Francisco since 1877, was “one of the most ably 
edited periodicals in the country,” and was among the many newspapers and journals he 
regularly subscribed to.83  Though Harbord did not explicitly mention Armenians in the letters 
included with his personal papers, his correspondence often alludes to Presidential speeches and 
political debates that undoubtedly exposed him to the staggering degree of influence Armenians 
had on American public opinion.   
In 1915, American diplomats joined the missionaries, European observers, and Armenian 
immigrants that informed the evolving narrative on Armenians.  Morgenthau – the former United 
States Ambassador to the Ottoman Empire who sent the 1919 letter urging Harbord to accept 
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responsibilities as an Allied Resident – was serving in Constantinople in 1915 and was a popular 
diplomatic figure in the American press for vocally opposing the Armenian deportations and 
mass killing in Eastern Anatolia.  “Among other American observers, Morgenthau, called it ‘the 
murder of a nation’” and urged the State Department to take immediate oppositional action.84  As 
politicians from all parties, bureaucrats, and powerful businessmen gradually replaced 
philanthropists and activists at the head of national relief efforts, the American public pressured 
Congress to act politically against the Ottomans. 85   
Legislators in Washington, D.C. responded by establishing the Near East Relief 
organization (initially named the American Committee for Armenian and Syrian Relief) in 
September 1915 to raise funds for Armenians.  The committee was led by James L. Barton, then 
foreign secretary for the ABCFM, and Cleveland H. Dodge.86  Additionally, at the request of 
Congress, President Wilson declared the 21st and 22nd of October Armenian relief days.87  
Newspapers eagerly publicized American political support for Armenians and ensured the public 
narrative rarely included competing sentiments.  Some scholars claim that the American political 
and organizational response to the 1915 massacres gave an inordinate voice to Armenian 
propaganda and permanently tainted America’s relationship with the Ottomans.88  Yet, this 
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political movement represented the extent to which Americans found Armenian suffering 
particularly deserving of recognition and philanthropic enterprise.   
When Harbord moved to Washington D.C. at the beginning of 1917 to join General John 
Pershing’s staff, news on the Armenians continued to escalate and publication rates leading up to 
June 1917 increased to 144 articles per month, surpassing initial publication rates during the first 
year and a half after the 1894 massacres.89  While these articles began introducing the American 
public to diplomatic commentary on the postwar future of Armenia, Harbord’s attention no doubt 
shifted to the impending mission in Europe.  When he joined the American Expeditionary Forces 
in Paris on 13 June 1917, the Western Front exposed Harbord to human tragedy that exceeded 
anything he had previously experienced.90   
 
Section II: A Worldview Shaped by Military Experience 
Thus far, the discussion has focused on describing how publication trends driven by 
American newspapers created a dominant public discourse on Armenians.  Though various 
assignments brought Harbord to many different locations throughout his military career, the 
media constantly exposed him to the American narrative as it evolved and assumed a strikingly 
pro-Armenian position from 1886 through 1917.  However, Harbord’s career prior to the 
American Military Mission to Armenia also exposed him to American international relations, 
affected his personal perceptions of hardship, and introduced ideas that competed with the public 
narrative.  Through analyzing Harbord’s military experience and exposure to institutional trends, 
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this section highlights significant elements of Harbord’s worldview that developed independent 
of the national news media and allowed Harbord to produce a predominantly impartial report 
influenced by his professional environment.  
 American officers often held shared convictions about native populations, especially 
those that were non-Christian.  While derogatory attitudes against foreign people were common 
in American discourse, limited groups, including the military, had the opportunity to interact 
with foreigners on a personal level and develop narratives suited to institutional values.  Many 
officers who had been to the Caribbean saw military intervention as a means “to inculcate 
respect for rule in what they saw as unruly societies.”91  Yet, even though a strong institutional 
narrative existed, some scholars argue that individuals maintained a degree of subjectivity in 
forming personal perceptions.   
Prior to World War I, interventions in Central America and the Caribbean typically began 
under exaggerated premises that a foreign civil war or rebellion endangered the United States’ 
national security and required military mediation.92  Harbord experienced the precursors to this 
trend during an assignment with the military government of Cuba after the Spanish-American 
War.  As the adjutant general in charge of managing personnel movement and the aide-de-camp 
to the Departmental Commander in Santiago, Harbord spent fifteen months drafting official 
memoranda and correspondences for Brigadier General Samuel Whitside and frequently engaged 
in discussions on America’s future in the Caribbean.93  During this time, Harbord earned a 
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reputation as “a strong man, of first-class ability, well instructed in his profession, and of 
excellent character.”94  In a letter to General Leonard Wood, then Governor-General of Cuba, the 
Deputy Provost Marshal General advocated that he was confident Harbord “would make an 
excellent regimental commander,” based on performance in the Spanish-American War.95  Three 
years later, when Leonard Wood first established provincial governorship in the Philippines, he 
requested Harbord to join his command.  Participation in the first occupation of Cuba introduced 
Harbord to “the cultural dimensions of a military occupation,” but exposure to American 
imperialism over the next twelve years in the Philippines further shaped his worldview.96   
Harbord’s service in the Philippines began in August 1903, when he assumed the role of 
Seventh Assistant Chief of Constabulary in the Zamboanga district, on Mindanao Island.97  At 
the beginning of the American campaign, Mindanao was a turbulent area where, as historian 
Brian Linn has described it, “simmering Muslim-pagan-Christian rivalry threatened to erupt into 
open warfare” and “tribal, ethnic, and sectarian unrest and banditry kept the region in turmoil.”98  
“On 1 June 1903 the Philippines Commission constituted the Muslim areas of Mindanao and 
Sulu as the Moro Province.”99  “Moro” was a term adopted from the Spanish which grouped 
 
94 “Letter from Lieutenant Colonel G.W. Baird to General Leonard Wood,” 15 February 1900, Item 32 from James 
G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 1. 
95 “Letter from Lieutenant Colonel G.W. Baird to General Leonard Wood,” 15 February 1900, Item 32 from James 
G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 1. 
96 Renda, Taking Haiti, 27. 
97 “Letter from Executive Secretary to Capt. Harbord,” from the Government of the Philippine Islands Executive 
Bureau in Manila, 20 August 1903, Item 56 from James G. Harbord Papers, 1886-1938, Box 1. 
98 Brian McAllister Linn, The Philippine War: 1899-1902 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 
180. 
99 Brian McAllister Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 37. 
31 
 
Muslims from various ethnic backgrounds into a single population.100  Within this turbulent 
region, Americans treated the inhabitants as subjects in their imperial experiment and the 
colonial atmosphere in Mindanao had a profound influence on Harbord.    
As his career advanced, the military exposed Harbord to paternalism and urged him to 
adopt an apathetic attitude towards hardship.  These were both prevalent factors that influenced 
Harbord’s personal perceptions of American international relations beyond the public discourse.  
When Harbord arrived at the Philippine Constabulary in the Moro Province, the constabularies 
were designed as centralized security forces, managed by Americans, that enabled local police to 
disseminate state information, monitor public discourse, and restrict civil liberties under the 
guise of pacification.101  The local police, or constabularymen, were recruited from Moro, pagan, 
and Christian communities within the province.  The constabulary expected American officers to 
institutionalize and homogenize the local constabularymen, to discourage internal differences 
and illustrate cohesion for the general populace as well.102  As a result, the Americans enforced 
institutional power to create a fixed notion of local culture in the Philippines by homogenizing 
the police force and expecting society to follow suit. 
The relationship between Harbord and other officers interacting daily with Filipinos was 
extremely nuanced, despite bearing resemblance to paternalism.  Beyond the familial metaphor 
of father-son or elder-“little brown brother” relationships, the American tendency to moralize 
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colonialism remained racially problematic and sometimes sustained imperialistic attitudes.103  
President Wilson had advocated that Philippine independence hinged on the Americans’ ability 
to guide the “the trajectory from savage to bureaucrat” and create a moral government modeled 
on American character.104  At the Constabulary level, this entailed homogenizing Filipino 
constabularymen into a productive unit, regardless of religious factions rooted in provincial 
culture.  W. Cameron Forbes, a civilian member of the Philippine Commission who kept a 
detailed journal of his service, recalled Harbord proudly reporting that religious divisions were 
improving in the Constabulary – revealing how Harbord embraced some American institutional 
aspirations and saw cultural homogenization as a legitimate, moral aim.105  
Regarding exposure to hardship, the Americans in the Philippines were products of an 
already brutal military institution where physical coercion and harsh measures were common 
means of enforcing discipline.  “Given the degree of physical punishment they endured, it would 
be surprising indeed if soldiers regarded slapping or punching people, tying them up, or 
threatening to shoot them as illegal or illegitimate actions.”106  Soldiers who were subjected to 
abuse within their own units would sometimes exert the same aggressiveness against Filipinos.  
This behavior normally applied to individuals frequently exposed to combat – such as junior 
officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers – but Harbord received reports of excessive 
misconduct and would have listened to countless stories of patrols that had gone awry and 
resulted in American atrocities.  Occasionally, Harbord joined missions “for the purpose of 
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reporting upon wild tribes,” where he personally witnessed Americans causing native 
suffering.107    
When it came to guerrilla engagements, senior American military officials argued that 
any natives conducting savage warfare summarily surrendered any claims to limited 
retaliation.108 In the early twentieth century, justifying harsh treatment of natives in colonial 
environments was a global trend.  American officers were familiar with reports of atrocities 
throughout Belgian, French, German, and British colonies in Africa, as well as against the Yaqui 
Indians in Mexico.109  After World War I, Europeans would extend this behavior into former 
Ottoman territory in Anatolia and the Eastern Mediterranean as well.  The institutional apathy 
towards human suffering juxtaposed with Harbord’s nuanced paternal relationship with the 
Filipinos would frame his perception of America’s role on the international stage.  Along with 
his observations from the 1919 mission, this new worldview influenced his recommendations on 
the suitability of a mandate and an American administrative relationship with the Armenians.  
After five and a half years in the Philippines, Harbord took leave from June through 
September 1906 to tour Asia and Europe before returning to his duties.  He kept a detailed diary 
of this trip, which is typed and takes up an impressive amount of space in the first volume of his 
self-curated memoirs.110  The entries from the overland train journey through Asia, followed by 
time spent touring Moscow and Constantinople revealed Harbord’s impressive understanding of 
agriculture, physical landscape, and natural resources in Asia.  It is clear from his writing that 
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Harbord was also extremely well-read on Russian, Ottoman, and European history, as well as 
knowledgeable on strategic relations in the Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.   
Although well informed, Harbord’s diary also reflects a certain underlying racism.  He 
makes fleeting references to the suspicious Ottoman sultan, indolent Turks, and a certain “Sick 
Man,” all of which revealed a standard American anti-Turkish discourse and a disparaging 
attitude towards Muslim natives, perhaps further cultivated in the Philippines.  In 1906, some of 
Harbord’s senior commanders in the Philippines still reflected imperialist attitudes gleaned from 
nineteenth-century European military doctrine.  “The cherished belief that ‘Asiatics’ responded 
only to force” was one example of imperialist language that continued to influence American 
officers.111  The self-conscious nature of Harbord’s diary illuminated his response to the military 
cultural narrative.112  While his comments often presented the sentiment that different Asian 
nationalities are “probably no queerer to us than we are to them,” once in Constantinople, his 
language exhibited racial allusions through blunt explanations that “Christians think of the Turks 
as some day to go back to the Asia from whence they came.”113  This portion of the diary shifted 
from the reflective tone Harbord used while describing the journey through China and Russia, 
and expressed a sharp, negative attitude towards the Muslim Turks observed in Constantinople.  
The subjective tone suggested that Harbord had residual bitter feelings against the Muslims he 
encountered in Moro Province because this disparaging attitude does not appear in his writing 
when Harbord describes the nature of Asian Christians, pagans, or Buddhists.  It also implied – 
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at least in that moment of reflection shown in his diary – that Harbord subscribed to the military 
narrative that force was a necessary solution to dealing with Turkish Muslims in particular.  
Harbord completed service in the Philippines in 1913 and his military career would not 
feature excessive hardship again until he arrived in France with the American Expeditionary 
Forces in June 1917.  Harbord spent the majority of World War I working as General Pershing’s 
Chief of Staff, where he garnered enormous respect for his professionalism, competence, and 
composure under pressure.  In 1918, Harbord requested a combat assignment and subsequently 
commanded the famed Second Division Marine Brigade at the 2nd Battle of the Marne and led 
the Franco-American Soissons offensive in July 1918 that halted the German threat to Paris.114  
Before ever considering a proposal like the one offered by Morgenthau in June 1919, Harbord 
had experienced intense human tragedy on the Western Front that dwarfed any imagery 
American newspapers could have produced on the Armenian atrocities. 
In the months following the 1918 Armistice, Harbord returned to Paris to reassume his 
former position as American Expeditionary Forces Chief of Staff.  As Harbord redirected his 
focus to managing the general staff, coordinating services of supply, and redeploying American 
troops, President Wilson and the American Commission to Negotiate Peace arrived alongside a 
variety of international plenipotentiaries to participate in the Peace Conference.  The United 
States had spent less than twenty months engaged in World War I and when the victorious Allies 
began discussing the prospect of continued post-war international involvement for America, 
President Wilson grudgingly commented that “the Philippines are still burning our hands.”115  
This attitude changed as summer 1919 arrived and Ottoman territorial solutions soon 
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monopolized discussions among the delegates.  Lloyd George noted that “when the question of a 
mandate over Armenia and the Straits was concerned, the President took a much more 
sympathetic view…It was essential therefore that we should find a mandatory Power which 
would undertake as a humane duty the protection of this harried Christian community.”116  
President Wilson’s partiality towards Armenians, despite his inherent understanding of risks 
associated with prolonged international intervention, enabled proponents of an American 
mandate to convince the President to order the American Military Mission to Armenia. 
Beyond President Wilson’s desire to ensure the American public “that he had done the 
best he could in seeking accurate information of actual conditions” in Armenia, a military 
mission was determined to be the best option to fill intelligence gaps in the region.117  Much of 
the general information on Eastern Anatolia available to American delegates in 1919 had been 
previously curated by The Inquiry.  “Rather than depend upon the State Department to deal with 
important matters of foreign policy, President Wilson early in his first administration had favored 
the practice of sending executive agents to foreign governments” to solicit information and 
compile reports for executive use.118  The Inquiry was the primary source of information on the 
status of the Armenians and was one of several advisory organizations that accompanied the 
President to Paris in December 1918 to assist the American delegates at the Peace Conference.119   
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Over the eight months Inquiry members spent in Paris prior to the American Military 
Mission to Armenia, they compiled exhaustive reports that yielded multiple models for a 
potential American mandate yet were unable to produce satisfactory information on the post-war 
strategic and military situation in Eastern Anatolia.  Louis H. Gray was an American Orientalist 
and original member of the Inquiry assigned to the Western Asia division, with special 
assignments reporting on commerce in Caucasia and colonial mandates.120  Early in the research 
period, Gray compiled an extensive series of notes criticizing Inquiry reports on the Ottoman 
territories and suggesting specific areas for additional investigation.  From Gray’s comments, it 
is clear that existing reports neglected to consider “the strategic value of the frontiers for the 
various subdivisions which have been proposed” within the former Ottoman Empire and “the 
military capacity of the various peoples who may possibly be formed into separate states.”121   
President Wilson was convinced that he could not accept a mandate without Senate 
approval, and this meant that someone still needed to gather accurate, impartial information on 
the strategic and military factors affecting potential American intervention.  Gray’s notes 
reinforced the President’s sentiments that “past humanitarian and educational interest in 
Armenia” made America a reasonable candidate to establish Armenia as a regional buffer state, 
but of all the areas complicating foreign policy in post-Ottoman territory, “Armenia is the most 
difficult, and this demands particular investigation.”122  So, after much discussion throughout 
July on commissioning a team that could travel to Eastern Anatolia, Secretary of State Lansing 
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finally confirmed via telegram on 1 August 1919 that President Wilson approved the 
“recommendation that a Mission of Investigation headed by General Harbord be sent to 
Armenia” to produce a thorough report on the conditions impacting a potential American 
mandate. 123   
Upon receipt of the telegram, Harbord expressed frustration at the initial lack of details 
and sought guidance from members of the American Commission to Negotiate Peace on the 
general scheme for the mission.  Though he understood “that the intention is to give the widest 
publicity to this Mission, the idea being that there is great public interest in the United States in 
Armenia,” Harbord had been engaged with his duties as Chief of Staff and unaware of the in-
depth discussions on a mandate that had taken place over the past month.124  General Pershing, 
Harbord’s commander and mentor, met with Harbord frequently to discuss the mission and 
disseminated official correspondence on 9 August 1919, directing his headquarters to “issue 
orders to General Harbord to consult with the American Mission in Paris and permit him to 
choose such personnel as he may see fit.”125  Two days later, Harbord was relieved of his Chief 
of Staff position and appointed Chief of the American Military Mission to Armenia with orders 
to “proceed from Paris, on temporary duty, to such points in Armenia as may be necessary for 
them to visit to carry out the instructions of the President of the United States as transmitted thru 
the Department of State.”126   
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Pershing’s correspondence also prompted the State Department to provide much-needed 
guidance on the mission, now that Pershing’s headquarters had officially assigned American 
Expeditionary Forces personnel to the President’s cause.  Frank Polk, head of the American 
Commission to Negotiate Peace and Under Secretary of State understood Pershing’s intent and 
sent a letter directly to Harbord outlining specific guidance for the American Military Mission to 
Armenia.  Polk wrote:  
“The President has designated you as Chief of a Military Mission to proceed without 
delay to Constantinople, Russian Transcaucasia and Syria, as will enable you to carry out 
instructions already discussed with you. It is desired that you investigate and report on 
political, military, geographical, administrative, economic and other considerations 
involved in possible American interests and responsibilities in that region. It should seem 
that this could be done in an absence of about two months. Upon the completion of this 
duty, you will return to the United States with your Mission and report in person to the 
President. A copy of your report should be furnished to the American Commission to 
Negotiate Peace.”127  
 
Content with Polk’s guidance, Harbord assembled his team and began intensive preparations for 
the mission.  Every military officer chosen by Harbord was carefully selected and assigned to a 
produce a special report on a specific portion of the investigation designated by the President.128  
These special reports would later constitute the appendices of the Harbord Report and were 
provided to the 66th United States Congress, alongside Harbord’s primary observations, for 
reference during the senatorial vote on the American mandate in Armenia.   
Harbord understood the high degree of international interest generated by the Armenians 
and impressed upon his team the importance of maintaining an impartial stance throughout the 
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mission and in the final report.  President Wilson specially chose the Military Mission to 
Armenia because Congress, American delegates, and Allied members of the Peace Conference 
believed that military officers possessed the capacity to produce a dispassionate report based on 
observations on the ground.  Additionally, Congress required military recommendations to 
determine if American forces could feasibly support repatriation of Armenian refugees and 
continued relief operations, two key components of formal interference in the region.129  Unlike 
prior investigative missions comprised of diplomats, philanthropists, and academics, a military 
mission would presumably avoid sensational tropes and emotional tone already permeating the 
public narrative on the Armenians.  Journalists referred to Harbord as a “trained and impartial 
military observer” and several articles from August and September 1919 appear in Harbord’s 
scrapbook of keepsakes.130  He understood that his perceived ability to render an impartial 
judgement on strategic factors present in post-war Anatolia was the principal reason the 
President agreed he should lead the mission – and he wholly intended to uphold that 
responsibility.  
In Paris, before the mission departed on 20 August 1919, Harbord and his team met with 
Peace Conference delegates from the regions they planned to visit and were provided reports on 
the Ottoman territory from the American Committee for Relief in the Near East, the Food 
Administration, the American Library of Congress, the Inquiry, and the American Mission to 
Negotiate Peace.131  Akar claimed in his dissertation that many of the reports submitted for 
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Harbord’s review were outdated, incorrect, or composed by staunch advocates of the Armenians, 
noting that “the Armenian Bureau, which was based in London, sent twenty-six publications, all 
of which were propaganda materials, and they were distributed to the members of the 
mission.”132  Though some scholars share Akar’s contention that the majority of material 
reviewed by the mission prior to their departure favored Armenians, evidence from Harbord’s 
team emphasized that the sheer volume of references received served only to introduce them to 
regional geography, history, and government.  Diary entries from the mission described the 
“mass of stuff to go through” and how “most of our time, however, is taken up with the subject 
of Armenia and Turkey in Asia,” but even the personal recollections alluded only to the 
generality of the material and did not suggest that the references influenced their observations 
beyond providing context.133   
Apart from the provided references, more conspicuous information overwhelmed the 
mission from unsolicited visitors who were already situated in Paris for the Peace Conference.  
On 9 August 1919, before Harbord received official orders assigning him as Chief of the 
American Military Mission to Armenia, the Paris Herald reported “an account of General 
Harbord going to Armenia upon the recommendation of Mr. Hoover,” opening the floodgates to 
international interest in the mission that would supposedly influence America’s decision to 
intervene in Armenia.134  Harbord’s last eleven days in Paris prior to departure were filled by 
meetings with Armenians – including the delegation representing Armenia at the Peace 
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Conference, Russian Army Officers, Persians, and Americans who were already immersed in 
Eastern Anatolian issues.   
One interview with an Armenian involved a thorough presentation on the post-war 
situation and recommended solutions, but when Harbord later asked the Armenian “How 
recently have you been in Armenia” and he replied, “Oh, I never was in Armenia. I was born in 
New York City,” the necessity for an investigatory mission by impartial observers became even 
more apparent.135  Though such meetings with individuals who feigned experience in Eastern 
Anatolia were frequent during this preparatory phase and described in other mission-members’ 
diaries, Harbord never alluded to them himself.  Instead, Harbord maintained a consciously 
dispassionate tone and described how before departure he and his team “listened to the personal 
experiences of many witnesses to the atrocities of 1915, and benefited by the views of many 
persons whose knowledge of the various peoples in the regions visited is that obtained by years 
spent among them.”136  The final report would demonstrate this tone and exemplify how 
Harbord’s professional military attitude and understanding of his mission enabled him to produce 
a predominately impartial report on the situation in Armenia.   
 
Section III: The Harbord Report 
On 2 September 1919, after twelve days aboard the U.S.S. Martha Washington, the 
American Military Mission to Armenia dropped anchor in Constantinople to commence their 
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forty-day journey through former Ottoman territories.137  The party consisted of eighteen officers 
responsible for compiling observations on the specific topics of investigation – eleven topics 
would later be included in the final report as appendices; seven Army field clerks primarily 
serving as stenographers; and twenty-five enlisted personnel who assisted the mission as 
interpreters, photographers, mechanics, draftsmen, chauffeurs, cooks, and orderlies.138  Four 
civilians also accompanied Harbord’s team to contribute their expertise on public and private 
finance, commerce and industry, and trade and communications.139  Within Anatolia and the 
Caucasus alone, the mission covered a cumulative of 2,053 kilometers by steamship, 3,864 
kilometers by railway, 3,557 kilometers by automobile, and 76 kilometers on horseback before 
arriving back in Constantinople and boarding their ship for the return journey to France.140    
The Harbord Report, completed onboard the U.S.S. Martha Washington on 16 October 
1919, reported observations on “political, military, geographical, administrative, economic, and 
other considerations involved in possible American interests and responsibilities” in former 
Ottoman territories.141  The language and recommendations in the main body of the report, 
composed by Harbord himself, suggested that Harbord’s familiarity with the dominant American 
narrative on Armenia and his prior military experience were both influential factors.  While 
Harbord’s prose and conclusions seemed mainly to express an impartial tone consistent with 
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institutional norms he adopted as an officer, peculiar moments when popular American tropes 
appear in the report revealed that he was unable to maintain the dispassionate style expected by 
Congress. 
Following a brief introduction, Harbord structured his report to directly respond to the 
mission’s purpose by concisely addressing “the history and present situation of Armenian 
people,” “the political situation and suggestions for readjustment,” “the conditions and problems 
involved in a mandate for Turkey and Transcaucasia,” “the military problem,” and “conclusions” 
for and against an American mandate.142  The prose has a direct tone and though the style is 
quite descriptive, the content is predominantly impartial, making the moments when Harbord 
deviates and incorporates anecdotal language appear peculiar.  Elements of Christian undertones 
and graphic descriptions of suffering both resembled language from the dominant American 
narrative on Armenia, while characterizations of non-Christians, assessments of regional 
destruction, and blunt descriptions of the hopeless situation faced by all remaining inhabitants 
instead modeled the detached perceptions of a war-hardened officer. 
Early in the report, when Harbord reflected that “the interest, the horror and sympathy of 
the civilized world are so centered on Armenia, and the purpose and work of this mission so 
focused on the blood-soaked region and its tragic remnant of a Christian population,” he revealed 
his tendency to illustrate religion with evangelical language reminiscent of the familiar American 
discourse.143  After describing the Armenians as surviving alongside Muslims on Christianity’s 
extreme frontier, Harbord chose to include the sentiment: “surely no faith has ever been put to 
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harder test or has been cherished at greater cost.”144  Since none of Harbord’s personal papers 
alluded to his own religious affiliations – including correspondence with his mother, interviews 
with his hometown newspaper, and reflections on his experience during World War I – it seemed 
that the Christian undertones in Harbord’s language were uniquely connected to the American 
narrative on Armenians rather than a personal affinity for evangelical tone.  Other members 
noted striking similarities from the accounts of Armenian massacres received from local 
missionaries and how the scenes differed “very little from those described in the Bible.”145  
Instances where the Harbord Report evoked a religious response were largely influenced by 
these interviews and reports from Christian relief groups that were frequently featured in 
newspapers during Harbord’s lifetime.        
The elements of prose that showed clear evidence of the American public narrative 
continued with the thorough descriptions of the 1915 deportation.  Harbord was very explicit in 
his portrayal of Armenian suffering with imagery of starvation, thirst, and rape.  During the 
mission, Harbord visited refugee camps in Aleppo and witnessed starving Armenian families 
“grouped together in one spot” in an old barrack yard, “surrounded by their few remaining 
possessions.”146  In Diyarbakir, the mission watched “a poor old woman dying on the sidewalk 
on the main street,” surrounded by other locals “diseased with all kinds of skin diseases” and left 
to suffer because the only doctors in the town were those accompanying Relief Commissions.147  
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Harbord understood that his report was partially intended to assure the American people that 
public interest in Armenian welfare was still a significant reason President Wilson sent an 
investigatory mission to Armenia.  Beyond providing the neutral information required by 
Congress to make a mandate decision, the Harbord Report needed to confirm the hardship that 
inundated the American press about the massacres and suffering in the region, otherwise 
American interference would be needless in the public mind. 
Harbord also tended to focus on the hardship of women and children, which both 
emphasized the innocence of the Armenian victims and conveyed the harsh reality that few men 
had survived.  In 1919, Harbord had been married to his wife Emma for thirty years.148  They 
had no children, but other American officers on the mission were parents and seeing the orphans 
and female refugees may have affected the American Military Mission to Armenia more 
viscerally than other images of human tragedy.  At an overnight camp outside of Erzurum, the 
mission encountered a little girl waiting by the automobiles and remarked that it was “difficult to 
realize that she is a human being.”149  Harbord wrote that “the women of this race were free from 
such diseases before the deportation,” plainly attributing their hardship to the Ottoman architects 
of the 1915 massacres, rather than to war in general.150  These images were included by Harbord 
to further illustrate the unjust suffering of Armenians.  Many American newspapers had similarly 
appealed to public charity using articles depicting wretched women and children.  Even during 
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periods of low publication rates, reporters chose to include human interest stories on Armenian 
women to evoke compassion.  
The first section of the report, which described Armenian history and the present situation 
for refugees, contained the most examples of language that imitated the American public 
discourse.  As the report progressed, Harbord moved beyond the typical narrative and adopted an 
increasingly neutral stance to address politics, administrative, and military considerations for a 
mandate.  The characterization of non-Christians, assessment of physical destruction, and 
summary of the remaining inhabitants demonstrated a distinct connection with Harbord’s 
previous military experiences, particularly his twelve years in the Philippines.   
Harbord explained the Ottomans and other non-Christian groups he encountered during 
the mission within the context of an ethnically diverse society – which resembled the Muslim, 
pagan, and Christian cultural elements of Moro Province.  Harbord highlighted data from the 
report appendices that explained how Eastern Anatolia’s “small area contains five great racial 
groups, divided into some forty distinct races.  Nine of these have arrived in comparatively 
recent times, but the remaining thirty-one are more or less indigenous.”151  The nuanced 
paternalism Americans adopted toward Filipinos appeared in Harbord’s description of how some 
American missionaries considered Turks “more genial” and did “not, as a rule, personally like 
the Armenian as well.”152  The dynamics of this relationship was profoundly different from the 
derogatory American narrative against non-Christian Turks.  During his time with the Philippine 
Constabulary, Harbord recounted feelings of pride when the constabularymen were able to 
overcome cultural differences and improve institutional effectiveness.  In Eastern Anatolia, the 
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positive descriptions Harbord included of missionaries personally preferring to interact with 
Turks suggested that he connected with relief members who had improved their organizational 
efforts by promoting cohesion between American Christians and Ottoman Muslims.  
The Kurds represented another subject group that Harbord chose to describe with 
language notably distinct from the dominant narrative that the newspaper headlines previously 
exposed him to in America.  Even while recounting an incident in the Caucasus when the 
“mission was fired upon by Kurds,” Harbord specified that the Kurds believed the mission to be 
hostile.153  The same incident was remembered by another mission member who wrote that “the 
Kurds were extremely friendly and they were very apologetic when they learned we were 
Americans…They said they did not want to use their rifles but they were forced to do so as they 
were surrounded by enemies.”154  Later in the report, Harbord added that Armenians were found 
responsible for much destruction as well and “Kurds appealed to this mission, with tears in their 
eyes, to protect them from Armenians who had driven them from their villages, appealing to be 
allowed to go back to their homes.”155  While the American public discourse made little effort to 
show how suffering in Eastern Anatolia was widespread regardless of race, ethnicity, or creed, 
Harbord chose to report the impartial spread of human tragedy and ongoing conflict in the 
region. 
Concerning physical destruction, the Harbord Report dispassionately detailed how 
cultivated land was unusable, crops were absent, villages were in ruins, trees were gone, and that 
armies had taken wooden supports from buildings for fuel.  Though roads remained serviceable, 
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Harbord wrote that Anatolia was gradually “sliding back to dependence on the camel caravan, 
the diminutive pack donkey, and the rattly, ramshackly araba wagon.”156  These observations 
demonstrate how, after witnessing the absolute destruction caused by trench warfare in Europe, 
Harbord viewed the physical state of Armenia dispassionately and characteristic of a war zone.   
Perhaps the most emotionless sections of the Harbord Report were the blunt descriptions 
of the hopeless situation faced by the people left in Eastern Anatolia.  The language did not favor 
Armenians, but instead showed how a war-hardened military officer would perceive human 
tragedy in the aftermath of war.  Harbord explained how the Turkish peasants were “equally 
destitute, and equally defenseless against the winter,” especially considering the noticeable 
“absence of men between the ages of twenty and thirty-five.”157  Harbord referred to the orphans, 
both Turkish and Armenian, as “pathetic little survivors of the unhappy years of war,” subsisting 
purely “on the charity of the American relief organizations, with some help, not great, however, 
from their more prosperous kinsmen domiciled in that region.”158  Though the American public 
narrative could have influenced the allusion to charity, Harbord chose to include non-Christian 
children as innocent survivors alongside the Armenians – an inclusive sentiment entirely absent 
from American discourse.   
Additionally, references to relief organizations indicated that Harbord understood the 
public-facing nature of his report and took advantage of his platform to impartially comment on 
the effectiveness of humanitarian groups, as well as disclose proof of corruption.  Harbord wrote 
that “charges of partiality favoring Christian against Moslem in equal distress are not infrequent” 
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and oftentimes “enthusiastic young Americans” in official and relief capacities are responsible 
for inefficient use of funds.159 Though Harbord clearly tried to offer some realistic criticism on 
relief organizations, he did not want to deter Americans from contributing money nor instigate 
anger from politicians and influential philanthropists. 
The reflections and recommendations in the Harbord Report continually resembled 
Harbord’s military experience in the Philippines.  After years spent working to homogenize and 
institutionalize the Filipinos in the Moro Province, Harbord maintained his optimistic opinion 
that “there is much to show that, left to themselves, the Turk and Armenian when left without 
official instigation have hitherto been able to live together in peace,” and concluded that his 
mission “saw nothing to prove that the Armenians who have returned to their homes in Turkey 
are in danger of their lives.”160  Harbord noted that international intervention in the region would 
be best implemented as a single mandatory that would put one state in charge of administrative 
affairs for the entire region.  This emphasized the same themes of homogenization that drove the 
American colonial government in the Philippines.  Though Harbord insisted that he did not 
believe America could devote sufficient attention to an Armenian mandate, if a mandate was 
approved, Harbord recommended that its “earliest efforts should be directed to the establishment 
of a native rural police or constabulary for the suppression of brigandage, outlawry, and other 
crimes,” a transparent reference to the Philippine Constabulary Harbord served with.161 
Finally, the main body of the Harbord Report concludes with a list of thirteen reasons 
against and fourteen reasons for the United States accepting a mandate, “based on all information 
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obtainable during six weeks’ constant contact with the peoples of the region.”162  Harbord used a 
similar list format in past reports composed for General Pershing, indicating a recurring style that 
Harbord determined to be dispassionate and appropriate for formal reports.163  Reasons against a 
mandate included the impartial political, military, geographical, administrative, and economic 
considerations that the American Military Mission to Armenia was commissioned to investigate.  
Harbord proposed that “domestic and nearer responsibilities take precedence,” intervention in 
Anatolia was “contrary to the Monroe Doctrine,” “humanitarianism should begin at home,” and 
that “the first duty of America is to its own people and its nearer neighbors.”164 
In contrast, Harbord’s reasons in favor of a mandate appealed to American ideals and 
Christian aspirations.  He wrote that “the Near East presents the greatest humanitarian 
opportunity of the age,” “intervention would be a liberal education for our people in world 
politics,” and that “America would prevent future massacres and provide justice for Armenians, 
Christians, Turks, Kurds, Greeks, and others.”165  Despite Harbord’s choice to include all 
Anatolian populations as worthy recipients of justice, the tropes employed among the reasons 
favoring a mandate showed the influence that American discourse had on the recommendations. 
Though the Harbord Report does not include many candid reflections of the authors, 
future research can overcome these limitations by investigating personal correspondence, 
articles, and books written by Harbord and other members of his mission that the United States 
published or curated during the interwar period.  Additionally, Ottoman, Armenian, British, and 
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French sources can enrich the one-sided American perspective, by illuminating foreign opinions 
on an American mandate and how interactions with the Military Mission to Armenia provide a 
valuable comparative lens for consideration.  
When World War II thrust the American military back into the international arena, a new 
generation of officers relinquished their predecessors’ association with impartiality.  Instead, the 
League of Nations inherited the fraught expectations to impart judgment over the mandates now 
constituting former Ottoman territory.  In the end, the United States Congress voted against a 
mandate for Armenia and even though the Senate published the Harbord Report and made it 
available for public scrutiny, interest in the Armenians had officially waned.  Furthermore, as 
President Harding ushered in the interwar era after his successful run in the 1920 elections, the 
United States turned away from Wilsonian idealism.  The human tragedy in Anatolia no longer 
appealed to Americans now that Congress denied diplomatic intervention and, gradually, the 
American public diverted humanitarian efforts elsewhere.   
My findings ultimately revealed that the pretense of an impartial report was fraught from 
the beginning and that by including popular tropes, Harbord exemplified how military advisors 
might better inform civilian decision-makers without taking neutrality to the extreme.  As an 
American military officer participating in a twentieth-century international humanitarian project, 
he exhibited the collective experience of his institution and became an individual personification 
of national public opinion.  Harbord’s prior military experience and exposure to the dominant 
American narrative on Armenians were both influential during the mission and impacted the 
final report.  But it was Harbord’s final remark that showed the extent that the public narrative 
affected him and influenced the American Military Mission to Armenia, despite the impartial 
descriptions and reflections from his prior military experience that were overwhelmingly present 
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in the report.  Instead of suggesting a balanced assessment of all reasons for and against a 
mandate, Harbord’s last comment invoked “America’s manhood and courage” and concluded 
with the public appeal: “Shall it be said that our country lacks the courage to take up new and 
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APPENDIX A. NEWSPAPERS PUBLISHING ARTICLES FEATURING ARMENIA 
Harbord’s     
Primary 
Location 





Manhattan, KS June 1886 January 1889 390 13 23 
Spokane, WA February 
1889 
July 1891 883 31 25 





June 1895 2119 101 25 
Fort Brown, TX July 1895 May 1898 7244 213 27 
Jacksonville, FL June 1898 June 1899 662 55 23 
Santiago, Cuba July 1899 May 1901 1252 57 25 
Fort Myer, VA June 1901 November 1901 514 102 25 
Philippine Islands December 
1901 
May 1906 2954 56 31 
Eurasian Travel June 1906 September 1906 161 53 21 
Philippine Islands October 
1906 





January 1917 3654 96 35 
Washington, DC February 
1917 
June 1917 567 144 32 
The above table represents an analysis of American newspapers that published articles 
featuring Armenia from June 1886 through June 1917, using queries from ProQuest Historical 
Newspapers online database.  I segmented the data over thirteen distinct time periods that are 
based on Harbord’s primary location as he moved for military assignments.  The date ranges for 
each location were determined from letters and orders sourced from the Library of Congress 
collection of Harbord’s personal papers.  Since the time periods at each location are not 
consistent, in addition to showing the total articles published, I also calculated the rate of articles 
published per month to normalize the data.  I included over fifty-eight American newspapers in 
this analysis and the numbers reflected in the last column show the number of newspapers that 
were reporting for each given time period.  The data peaks at only thirty-seven newspapers 
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